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We should reconcile ourselves with the fact that we are confronted, not with one concept, but with several different concepts[.] [W]e should try to make these concepts as clear as possible (by means of definition, or of an axiomatic procedure, or in some other way); to avoid further confusions, we should agree to use different terms for different concepts; and then we may proceed to a quiet and systematic study of all concepts involved, which will exhibit their main properties and mutual relations. (Tarski 1944, p. 355)

*Penultimate version: Final version to appear in Pluralisms in Truth and Logic (2018, Palgrave Macmillan).
	
This paper explores the future of functionalism about truth. I’ll aim to defend functionalism while also explaining why and how functionalists should rely on empirical evidence regarding ordinary thought about truth. I’ll begin by sketching the functionalist framework and outlining some of its signature virtues.  Next, I’ll raise what I take to be the most serious problem with functionalism—that although it entails empirical claims regarding ordinary thought about truth, its main proponent Michael Lynch has offered no empirical evidence in support of the view.
	I’ll then venture to patch this lacuna by discussing some extant empirical data on ordinary thought about truth.  These data, while inconclusive and in need of supplementation, support two underinvestigated pluralist views of ordinary thought about truth.  Once we integrate these pluralist approaches with the functionalist framework, we get a much more nuanced view that is appropriately sensitive to relevant empirical findings.  
	To close my defense, I’ll take a look at a second, pressing objection to functionalism that has been advanced by Cory Wright (2010) and explain why it doesn’t point to any serious flaws in functionalism.  My overall conclusion, then, will be that functionalism is a distinctive and promising approach to the study of truth that can withstand philosophical scrutiny and cleanly integrate empirical inquiry into our ongoing search for the nature of truth.

1 Truth: concept and property
	The ur-question of truth theory is, of course, ‘What is truth?’  In contemporary work on truth, a distinction is often drawn between the ordinary, or folk concept truth and the property (or relation) truth that is allegedly represented by this concept.​[1]​  The folk concept truth is meant to be a concept that we employ prior to receiving any philosophical training and that professional philosophers tend to use when not thinking about philosophical issues pertaining to truth.​[2]​
	William Alston (2002, p. 11) provides a paradigmatic motivation for drawing the concept-property distinction in truth theory, noting that:​[3]​

“[A] property might have various features not reflected in our concept of that property. To choose a well worn example, heat (the property of a physical object’s being more or less hot) is revealed by physics to be an average kinetic energy of constituent molecules, even though our ordinary concept of heat involves no such component (that’s not the way we ordinarily identify heat).”

	Alston’s insight is that since truth is a folk concept, it may fail in some respects to adequately represent truth.  Analogies are especially helpful here, as Alston’s own analogy with heat shows.  A similar, and familiar case is that of jade.  We ordinarily conceive of jade as being a single, typically green kind of mineral that is e.g. often used in Asian art.  Yet while it is true that many familiar varieties of jade are green and that jade is often used in Asian art, chemists have discovered that there are actually two kinds of mineral—jadeite and nephrite—that we ordinarily call ‘jade.’  This means that although our folk concept jade does provide a partially accurate representation of the nature of jade, there is more to the nature of jade than what it represents.
	As a result, when truth theorists set about their business, they actually confront not the single, traditional question ‘What is truth?’ but rather the following series of comparatively fine-grained questions:

(i) What is the nature of the folk concept truth?

(ii) What is the nature of the property truth that it allegedly represents?







	The most developed response to these questions comes from Michael Lynch (2000, 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2005, 2009, 2013), who advocates functionalism about truth, or alethic functionalism.  Alethic functionalism is inspired by the functionalist theories of mind and morality respectively championed by David Lewis (1966, 1970, 1972, 1994) and Frank Jackson (1998). Like these theories, alethic functionalism consists of two stages that involve the method of Ramsification.​[4]​
	The first stage of alethic functionalism is the Conceptual Stage. The aim here is to offer an account of the folk concept truth. We begin by amassing a set S of sentences that contain ‘true’ or ‘truth’ (or both). The sentences in S must express propositions p1,...,pn that all and only the possessors of truth  are disposed to believe upon reflection.  Following Lynch, we can call p1,...,pn the folk theory FT  of truth.  It is worth emphasizing that according to the functionalist, possession of truth doesn’t require that one explicitly believe p1,...,pn .  What is required, rather, is a disposition to believe p1,...,pn, provided that one has the concepts that one needs to understand these propositions and has also reflected on the propositions long enough to understand them
	To illustrate, Lynch takes FT to include the propositions expressed by the following sentences:​[5]​

(Objectivity) A belief is true iff with respect to that belief, things are as they are believed to be.

(Norm of Belief) It is prima facie correct to hold a belief iff that belief is true.

(End of Inquiry) Other things being equal, holding true beliefs is a worthy goal of inquiry.

	The second stage of alethic functionalism is the Metaphysical Stage. The ambition here is to determine whether any actual properties have the features that are ascribed to truth in FT. To clarify what these features are, we construct the Ramsey sentence of FT.
	The first step is to regiment the grammar of the sentences that pertain to FT. In particular, we replace every instance of ‘true’ with ‘truth’ and adjust the sentences’ grammar appropriately. We then conjoin them to deliver the postulate PT of FT:

(PT) A belief exemplifies truth iff with respect to that belief, things are as they are believed to be and it is prima facie correct to hold a belief iff that belief exemplifies truth and other things being equal, holding beliefs that exemplify truth is a worthy goal of inquiry.

	Next, we replace every instance of ‘truth’ in PT with an objectual variable y and we bind these variables with an existential quantifier. This delivers the Ramsey sentence RT of FT, which has the following form:

(RT) There is a y (a belief exemplifies y iff with respect to that belief, things are as they are believed to be and it is prima facie correct to hold a belief iff that belief exemplifies y and other things being equal, holding beliefs that exemplify y is a worthy goal of inquiry).


















Figure 1: Alethic functionalism


	One attractive feature of functionalism is that it incorporates Ramsification, which is a precise and well-understood method.​[8]​ It also comports with Alston’s insight by allowing for the possibility that the representation provided by the folk concept truth is partially accurate, even as there is more to say about the metaphysics of truth than what is articulated in this concept. If FT is uniquely or multiply realized, then the properties that realize it may have additional features that aren’t mentioned in FT. On the other hand, if FT is unrealized, then that, too, will probably come as a surprise to many possessors of the folk concept truth, insofar as they presumably take some property in the world to answer to their thought and talk about truth.  This, then, would also be a sense in which the truth about the nature of truth diverges from the representation afforded by truth.  
	In connection with this second virtue, I would emphasize a point that is sometimes overlooked in discussions of alethic functionalism.  This is that functionalism itself is completely neutral regarding the metaphysics of truth, apart from the constraints imposed by FT. In principle, inquiry along functionalist lines could lead us to accept a monist, pluralist, or deflationary account of truth’s nature, and it’s clear that these metaphysics of truth are strikingly different.  Rather than being regarded as a metaphysics of truth, then, functionalism is best described as a method for inquiring about truth that cleanly articulates a way in which conceptual inquiry about truth can inform metaphysical inquiry about truth.​[9]​

2.2 Functionalism’s empirical debt

	We’ve seen, then, that functionalism enjoys some significant virtues, and this is all to the good. However, I want now to describe what I take to be functionalism’s most serious shortcoming and to then explain how we should remedy it.
	The functionalist’s main ambition at the Conceptual Stage is to offer an account of the folk concept truth.  Their driving idea is that this concept is underwritten by the folk theory FT of truth, and Lynch articulates a view as to which propositions comprise FT.  We should now ask: what evidence do we have that FT in fact consists of the propositions expressed by (Objectivity), (Norm of Belief), and (End of Inquiry)?
	Lynch offers two lines of evidence in support of his view on FT.  One is that he suspects that the propositions at issue are among our most fundamental (implicit) beliefs about truth.​[10]​ The other is that certain influential philosophers such as Aristotle, James, and Peirce have taken these propositions to be central truths about truth.​[11]​
	The basic problem is that these lines of evidence are inadequate in principle.  Lynch’s view about FT is empirical—it is a view about how ordinary thinkers are, in fact, disposed to think about truth.  However, we have little reason to believe that philosophers enjoy special insight into this issue. When we receive our professional training, we no doubt acquire a range of new abilities, but we don’t tend to spend much time in graduate school systematically examining how untrained, native speakers think about philosophically relevant issues.  Accordingly, Lynch’s suspicion that we tend to believe the propositions expressed by (Objectivity), (Norm of Belief), and (End of Inquiry) provides only very weak evidence that we actually tend to do so.
	Similarly, we have little reason to believe a priori that influential philosophers’ views about truth will closely align with those of ordinary thinkers.  For this reason, the fact that Aristotle, James, and Peirce believed the propositions at issue provides only very weak evidence that ordinary thinkers are disposed to do the same.  Functionalism, then, incurs an empirical debt that Lynch’s lines of evidence simply fail to settle.
	The good news, however, is that the functionalist can settle their empirical debt, provided that they are willing to do the proper sort of work.  This work involves gathering empirical data on ordinary thought about truth and then using this data at the Conceptual Stage.  In light of the results at the Conceptual Stage, the functionalist will then need to re-examine the options that are available at the Metaphysical Stage.
	In the remainder of the paper, I want to outline some of the data that we currently have on ordinary thought about truth and to indicate what lessons they may hold.  I’ll then explain how all of this affects the functionalist framework.  To anticipate, I take the main upshot for functionalism to be that once we appreciate the trajectory along which our current data are leading us, we are able to glimpse some previously obscured options at the Metaphysical Stage.

3 Data and conceptual pluralism

3.1 Interlinguistic and intralinguistic conceptual pluralism

	As we’ll see, our current data point towards a notable degree of complexity in ordinary thought about truth.  Accordingly, it will be useful to clearly articulate a pluralist view of ordinary thought about truth that has two main features.  First, it should at least be supported by many of our data.  Second, such a view should be able to serve as a guiding hypothesis in future studies of ordinary thought about truth.
	The basic thesis behind what we’ll call conceptual pluralism about truth is that there is more than one actual, folk truth concept. Notice, then, that conceptual pluralism isn’t the claim that there could be thinkers who use a truth concept that differs from the one used by, say, contemporary English speakers. Rather, it is a claim about the actual world to the effect that it contains thinkers some of whom use a different truth concept than do others.
When we evaluate conceptual pluralism empirically, the following basic procedure should serve us well.​[12]​ We begin by examining ordinary speakers’ usage of ‘true’ and ‘truth,’ as well as words in other languages that can be directly translated using ‘true’ or ‘truth.’  Call any such word a piece of alethic vocabulary.  If we find significant differences in speakers’ usage of alethic vocabulary, then we should go on to determine whether some speakers associate different concepts with these words than others do.  Any concepts that we discover we’ll provisionally call truth concepts.​[13]​
	We can distinguish between two kinds of conceptual pluralism. The first is what we’ll call interlinguistic conceptual pluralism:

(Inter) There are at least two actual linguistic communities L1 and L2 such that some L1-members use a truth concept T1, whereas some L2-members use a distinct truth concept T2.

	Accordingly, if we discover two linguistic communities L1 and L2 such that all L1-members use a truth concept T1 and all L2-members use a distinct truth concept T2, this will verify interlinguistic conceptual pluralism. However, the thing to notice is that we needn’t arrive at precisely this discovery in order to show that interlinguistic conceptual pluralism is true. Rather, all that is needed to verify this view is that there be a linguistic community L1 some (but not necessarily all) of whose members use a truth concept T1 in addition to another linguistic community L2 some (but not necessarily all) of whose members use a distinct truth concept T2.
	A second variety of conceptual pluralism is what we can call intralinguistic conceptual pluralism:

(Intra) There is at least one actual linguistic community L such that some L-members use a truth concept T1, whereas other L-members use a distinct truth concept T2.

















Figure 2: Consistency of interlinguistic and intralinguistic pluralism


	In the rest of this section, I’ll be arguing that both intralinguistic and interlinguistic pluralism enjoy notable support from our existing data.  As matters stand, the proper assessment is that these data are suggestive, though quite far from conclusive. This means that further study is needed before we can be very confident in any view of ordinary thought about truth.  However, what I hope to bring out is that both intralinguistic and interlinguistic pluralism are very live theoretical options.

3.2 Intralinguistic pluralism: correspondence and gender

	In discussing intralinguistic pluralism, I’ll be drawing on a recent study by Robert Barnard and Joseph Ulatowski (2013).​[14]​  Barnard and Ulatowski sought to investigate the extent to which their subjects agreed with what they call the correspondence root:​[15]​

(CR) Truth involves agreement, copying, or correspondence between what (in the mind or in language) is true and what (in the mind or in the world) makes it true.

	They elicited responses from 200 English-speaking subjects to one of nine vignettes.  To assess their subjects’ agreement with (CR), Barnard and Ulatowski presented them with a probe statement that is meant to be similar to (CR) but framed in non-technical language:

(1)	If a claim reports how the world is, then it is true.

It is worth pausing at this stage to note that there is a significant bug in Barnard and Ulatowski’s experimental design.  Insofar as it states that truth involves agreement, copying, or correspondence, (CR) suggests that correspondence is a necessary condition for truth.  By contrast, the probe statement (1) states that ‘reporting how the world is’ is a sufficient condition for truth.  As a result, the reactions of Barnard and Ulatowski’s subjects to (1) wouldn’t seem to provide evidence as to the attitudes that they would take towards (CR).  Rather, Barnard and Ulatowski’s data look to provide insight into how their subjects would think about the converse of (CR), which we might call the modified correspondence root:

(MCR) If a thought or claim copies, agrees with, or corresponds to what (in the mind or in the world) would make it true, then that thought or claim is true.

When evaluating Barnard and Ulatowski’s findings in what follows, then, we will take their findings to concern (MCR), rather than (CR).  Future studies could profitably investigate subjects’ attitudes towards (CR) by using the converse of (1), rather than (1), as a probe statement.
Two of Barnard and Ulatowski’s findings involve the Bruno case and the Donna case:​[16]​

Bruno case: Bruno has just finished painting his house. Bruno painted his house the same color as the sky on a clear summer day. Bruno claims his house is blue.

Donna case: Donna is traveling in Germany, but does not speak German. She watches as a sailor asks for der Stadtplan and is handed what looks like a map of the city. Donna asks for der Stadtplan in a shop and is sold a city map. Donna still speaks no German, but believes that asking for der Stadtplan is a good way to obtain a city map from a German shopkeeper.

	In the Bruno case, Bruno makes an ordinary, observational claim.  Similarly, in the Donna case, Donna forms a belief about an ordinary, practical issue. Accordingly, Barnard and Ulatowski hypothesized that these cases would elicit high degrees of agreement with (1) among their subjects.​[17]​
	However, what they found was that when presented with these cases, male subjects expressed stronger agreement with (1) than female subjects. In particular, when presented with the Donna case, male subjects tended to agree with (1), whereas female subjects tended to disagree with (1).  Using a 5-point Likert scale with a midpoint of 3, Barnard and Ulatowski found that the mean male and female responses to the Bruno case were 3.96 and 3.07 respectively. Likewise, the mean male and female responses to the Donna case were 3.56 and 2.60 respectively.​[18]​ These differences are statistically significant (Bruno: N = 41, t(39) = 2.305, p < .027; Donna: N = 40 (25 male, 15 female), t(37.701) = 2.521, p < .016).
	Pending further study of English speakers’ thought about truth, no single interpretation of Barnard and Ulatowski’s findings is clearly superior to its competitors. However, it is clear that their findings lend support to intralinguistic pluralism.  To explain their data along intralinguistic pluralist lines, we first hypothesize that there are at least two folk truth concepts TCL and TCA. To possess TCL, one must be disposed to accept (MCR) upon reflection (at least when thinking about certain topics).  To possess TCA, by contrast, one need not be disposed to do so.​[19]​ Thus, we might call TCL a correspondence-leaning concept and TCA a correspondence-averse concept. The proffered explanation of Barnard and Ulatowski’s findings would then be that among English speakers, males are more likely than females to possess TCL, whereas females are more likely than males to possess TCA.  
	Future studies should reevaluate this hypothesis by attempting to replicate Barnard and Ulatowski’s results among English speakers.  They should also test similar hypotheses about other linguistic communities.  Additionally, I would note that in evaluating the intralinguistic pluralist explanation of Barnard and Ulatowski’s findings, we should determine whether there are plausible explanations as to why male English speakers would be more likely to possess TCL, whereas female English speakers are more likely to possess TCA.

3.3 Interlinguistic pluralism: English and Akan

3.3.1 English speakers on correspondence

	Regarding interlinguistic pluralism, the first thing to say is that to my knowledge, there are no published, empirical studies that seek to evaluate this hypothesis.​[20]​ However, in a series of pioneering papers, Kwasi Wiredu (1985, 1987, 2004) brings to light two plausible conjectures that support interlinguistic pluralism.  Wiredu’s conjectures concern English and the Ghanaian language Akan.  Like Barnard and Ulatowski, Wiredu draws our attention to English and Akan speakers’ respective views on truth and correspondence. In doing so, he considers a claim that differs slightly from both (CR) and (MCR), which we can call the correspondence thesis:

(CT) True propositions are those that correspond to facts.

	Wiredu’s first conjecture concerns English speakers’ attitudes towards (CT).  Suppose that an ordinary English speaker were presented with the following attempt at a definition of truth:

(2) True propositions are those that are true.

It’s reasonable to hypothesize that most such speakers would recognize upon reflection that (2) is viciously circular, which would cause them to refrain from agreeing that (2) is an accurate definition of truth.  By contrast, Wiredu would conjecture that adult English speakers will tend to evaluate (CT) differently, if asked to consider it as a definition of truth.  His first conjecture is:​[21]​

(WC1) Few (say, < 50% of) native English speakers are disposed to believe upon reflection that (CT) is viciously circular.

	Notice, then, that (WC1) is not a conjecture about English speakers’ agreement or disagreement with (CT).  Rather, it is a conjecture about the percentage of English speakers who are disposed to believe upon reflection that (CT) is viciously circular.  Presumably, if one did believe that (CT) is viciously circular, then one would refrain from agreeing that it is an accurate definition of truth.  However, what is worth observing is that an English speaker might refrain from believing that (CT) is viciously circular, even though they don’t accept it as an accurate definition of truth.  This would be the position, for instance, of an English speaker who favors an alternative (e.g. relativist) definition of truth but grants that (CT) is a way that one might reasonably attempt to define truth.  This shows that (WC1) doesn’t entail that most English speakers are disposed to believe upon reflection that (CT) is an accurate definition of truth (this, of course, is a virtue of (WC1), given the data that we examined in § 3.2).
	(WC1) awaits direct empirical confirmation.  However, it is weakly supported by two lines of empirical data, due respectively to David Bourget and David Chalmers and Barnard and Ulatowski.  Bourget and Chalmers (2014) surveyed professional philosophers in 99 leading philosophy departments, most of which (89) are located in English-speaking countries.​[22]​ One of their survey questions was ‘Truth: correspondence, deflationary, or epistemic?’ 50.8% of their respondents (± 1.5%) indicated that they either accepted or leaned toward some sort of correspondence theory of truth (ibid. pp. 477, 498). This means that either a sizable minority or a slim majority of their respondents favored something like (CT) and would thus presumably take (CT) to be free from vicious circularity.  
	In the present context, Bourget and Chalmers’ results are admittedly limited.  One reason is that they didn’t explicitly use (CT) in their study.  Another is that their target group consisted of professional philosophers, whereas (WC1) is a conjecture about native English speakers more generally.  Despite these limitations, though, Bourget and Chalmers’ findings provide weak support for (WC1).
	Additionally, Barnard and Ulatowski sought in a recent study to examine the degree to which both professional philosophers and non-philosophers take truth to be objective. In doing so, they examined their subjects’ agreement and disagreement with various probe statements, one of which is:

(3) When a claim is true, it expresses a fact.

	Barnard and Ulatowski (2017, Tables 3 and 5) found that 86% of their philosophers and 85.8% of their non-philosophers either agreed or strongly agreed with (3).  It’s thus plausible that most of these subjects took (3) to be free from vicious circularity.  
	These findings are also admittedly limited in the present context, given that (3)–in contrast to (CT)–doesn’t explicitly mention correspondence and wasn’t explicitly presented as a (partial) definition of truth.  However, like Bourget and Chalmers’ findings, they also provide weak support for (WC1).  In light of the limitations of the existing evidence that bears on (WC1), it would be especially helpful for future studies to directly examine the degree to which English speakers take (CT) to be viciously circular.

3.3.2 Akan speakers on correspondence

	When exploring English and Akan speakers’ views on truth and correspondence, Wiredu (1987, p. 29) also considers a direct translation of (CT) into Akan:

(CTA) Asem no te saa kyerese ene nea ete saa di nsianim.

In (CTA), ‘true’ and ‘fact’ are translated using the same Akan expression ‘ete saa,’ which means it is so.  Thus, as Wiredu points out, (CTA) can also be faithfully translated into English as ‘That a proposition is so amounts to its coinciding with what is so.’  This observation leads Wiredu to offer the following insightful conjecture:

“This has the beauty of a tautology, but it teaches little wisdom. It seems to me unlikely that thinking in this language, one could be easily tempted into correspondence formulations of this sort. Indeed, in this language, it is pretty clear that the problem of truth must be the problem of clarifying the idea of something being so.” (Ibid. Cp. 1985, p. 47; 2004, pp. 48-9)

We can thus render Wiredu’s second conjecture along the following lines:

(WC2) Most (> 50% of) native Akan speakers are disposed to believe upon reflection that (CTA) is viciously circular.

Like (WC1), (WC2) awaits direct empirical confirmation.  However, in their own investigations of Akan alethic vocabulary, J.T. Bedu-Addo (1985, pp. 70, 76-7) and Safro Kwame (2010) express sympathy with Wiredu’s contention that ‘true’ and ‘fact’ should be translated using a single Akan expression.​[23]​  We thus have strong preliminary evidence that (CTA)’s vicious circularity will be apparent to native Akan speakers.  As a result, (WC2), like (WC1), is a plausible conjecture and should be empirically evaluated.
	 (WC1) and (WC2) lend support to interlinguistic pluralism, which can explain them along the following lines.  We first hypothesize that most English speakers possess some truth concept T1 as well as a distinct concept fact that is independent of T1 in the sense that it is definable without reference to T1.  They deploy these concepts when interpreting (CT) and will accordingly take (CT) to be free from vicious circularity.  By contrast, it seems that when they reflect on (CTA), most Akan speakers don’t deploy a truth concept as well as a distinct fact concept.  Rather, they deploy a single concept being so that doubles as a truth concept and a fact concept. Since they deploy being so when interpreting (CTA), they will accordingly take (CTA) to be viciously circular.  It then follows that T1 ≠ being so, which confirms interlinguistic pluralism.  As a result, although additional empirical work is needed to fully assess (WC1) and (WC2), it is clear that interlinguistic pluralism promises a neat explanation of Wiredu’s conjectures.  

4 An updated functionalism 

	We’ve now seen that both intralinguistic and interlinguistic pluralism enjoy a good deal of plausibility.  For this reason, it will be interesting to see how we can integrate them into the broader functionalist framework.​[24]​ In § 2.1, we saw that the standard functionalist approach consists of two stages—the Conceptual and Metaphysical Stages. In essence, the Conceptual and Metaphysical Stages now decompose into various sub-stages, which increases the number of options that are available at the Metaphysical Stage.  Figure 3 offers a graphical depiction of this updated functionalist framework, which I’ll now briefly describe.
Suppose that upon investigation, we discover that there are n actual, folk truth concepts T1,...,Tn, where n > 1.  At conceptual sub-stage c1, we identify the folk theory FT1 of T1. We then move to the corresponding metaphysical sub-stage m1 and construct the Ramsey sentence RT1 for T1. Next, we determine whether FT1 is uniquely realized, multiply realized, or unrealized. We apply this procedure at all conceptual and metaphysical sub-stages c1,...,cn  and m1,...,mn.
	Lastly, we want to evaluate the metaphysical results at m1,...,mn. Call the metaphysical sub-stage that we now occupy the final (pending further investigation) metaphysical sub-stage mf.  Interestingly, at mf, we now have five basic possibilities:

(a) Monism: All of the folk theories FT1,...,FTn are uniquely realized by the same property P;

(b) Pluralism1: All of the folk theories are uniquely realized, but some are realized by a different property than others;

(c) Pluralism2: Some, but not all, of the folk theories are multiply realized;

(d) Pluralism3: All of the folk theories are multiply realized; and

(e) Deflationism: All of the folk theories are unrealized.

	Options (a) and (e) are the most familiar, insofar as they respectively represent monism and a pure sort of deflationism. We can helpfully think of options (b)-(d) as representing increasingly complex grades of pluralism about the properties that realize the various truth concepts.  These grades of pluralism mark the basic degrees to which multiple realization can creep into our metaphysics of truth when we try to navigate the divide between monism and deflationism.​[25]​  












































Figure 3: Updated functionalism





	Thus far, my defense of alethic functionalism has mainly consisted of an effort to outline how the functionalist should pay off their considerable empirical debt.  I want to wrap up this defense by looking at an objection to functionalism that comes from Cory Wright.  This objection deserves extended reflection because it strikes at the conceptual bedrock of the functionalist programme—namely, the functionalist’s use of Ramsification.  Accordingly, if it succeeds, then all that I’ve said in defense of functionalism is essentially for naught.
	While Wright would presumably allow that theorists such as Lewis and Jackson can fruitfully use Ramsification to investigate the natures of mental states or moral rightness, he takes there to be a distinctive problem with using Ramsification to inquire about the nature of truth.  Wright succinctly articulates his misgiving as follows:​[26]​

“Functionalists about truth implicitly define their (nominalized) τ-term true by using Ramsification to produce a sentence that indicates its denotation. But any implicit definition proceeds on the basis of explicit decisions that the principles constitutive of [the given theory] T are themselves true. Hence the circularity. In turn, making any explicit decisions that they are true requires already knowing in advance what truth is. Hence the epistemic circularity. If we suppose further that knowing in advance what truth is entails knowing what the τ-name truth denotes, then it becomes unclear why functionalists about truth ever required an implicit definition via Ramsification in the first place. Hence the problem.”

	To make our discussion of Wright’s challenge more fluid, we can simplify matters by supposing that the functionalist posits only one folk truth concept truth.  Given the data from § 3, it is unlikely that this should be the functionalist’s actual stance.  However, if the functionalist endorses conceptual pluralism, then a version of Wright’s objection will loom at each metaphysical sub-stage m1,…,mn, so the objection is pressing in either case.
	Wright takes functionalism to suffer from what he calls ‘epistemic circularity.’  He points out that when the functionalist details the postulate PT at the Metaphysical Stage, it’s fair to think of them as attempting not only to clarify the folk concept truth, but also to implicitly define the word ‘truth.’​[27]​  The problem is supposed to arise from the alleged fact that in offering this implicit definition, the functionalist is claiming that they know that the conjuncts of PT are true.  To know that the conjuncts of PT are true, Wright insists, the functionalist must have prior knowledge of the nature of the property truth.  
The question then becomes: how is the functionalist supposed to know what truth’s nature is? The functionalist aims to acquire knowledge of truth’s nature by constructing PT, using PT to construct the Ramsey sentence RT, and then determining which property witnesses RT.  Yet if Wright is correct, then when they follow this procedure, the functionalist claims (implicitly) that they know that the conjuncts of PT are true.  
The core of the problem, then, is this: knowledge that PT’s conjuncts are true must, says Wright, be based on prior knowledge of truth’s nature—which, if the functionalist is correct, must be based on prior knowledge that PT’s conjuncts are true.  It thus seems that in relying on Ramsification, the functionalist is claiming to have knowledge—that PT’s conjuncts are true—that they simply can’t acquire, given the strictures of their own view. To close, I’d like to mount a direct defense of functionalism against Wright’s worry.  That is, I’ll aim to explain why functionalism isn’t viciously circular in the way that he suggests.​[28]​ 

5.2 Why functionalism isn’t epistemically circular

For the sake of argument, I will suppose with Wright that the functionalist takes all of PT’s conjuncts to be true.​[29]​ We then pose Wright’s problem: to know that PT is true, mustn’t the functionalist already know the nature of the property that ‘truth’ denotes, i.e. truth? But isn’t their view that our knowledge of truth’s nature is based on our prior knowledge of PT?  If so, then it seems that to come to know that PT is true, they must already know that PT is true, which is impossible.
	The functionalist should dispel this impression of circularity by pointing out that they can know that PT is true without already knowing the nature of truth. This follows from a more general principle.  Assuming that A is a competent user of the word ‘true:’​[30]​

(4) If A knows that p and they know that the content of sentence ‘S’ is that p, then A knows that ‘S’ is true.

	To see the plausibility of (4), suppose that a high school student Van looks at the whiteboard in his classroom and sees the sentence ‘The chemistry exam will begin at 1:30 p.m. today.’ Van knows that the content of this sentence is that the chemistry exam will begin at 1:30 p.m. on that day. If he also knows that the exam will in fact begin at 1:30 p.m. on that day, then he knows that the sentence on the whiteboard is true. It’s simply not the case that to know that the sentence is true, Van must know what the nature of truth is.  It’s enough that he’s a competent user of the word ‘true’ and thus understands how this word applies to English sentences.
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^1	  In what follows, I’ll use italics to denote properties and relations and small caps to denote concepts.
^2	  Cp. Lynch (2009, p. 7).
^3	  For further illuminating reflections on this distinction, see Asay (2013, ch. 1; 2018); Bar-On and Simmons (2007); Eklund (2017, § 2); and Lynch (2005; 2009, ch. 1).
^4	  For a canonical account of Ramsification, see Lewis (1970).
^5	  (2009, ch. 1).  I’ve altered the wording of the sentences, though this won’t influence the concern that I’ll develop for functionalism in § 2.2.  In making these alterations, I’ve been guided by the assiduous study of Lynch’s functionalism by Marian David (2013).
^6	  More specifically, this metaphysics of truth amounts to what Künne (2003, pp. 3-4, ch. 2) calls “nihilism,” or what I prefer to call pure deflationism. Not all deflationists (e.g. Horwich 1998) are pure deflationists in this sense, but some (e.g. Quine (1948, 1970) and Strawson (1949, 1950)) have endorsed or would endorse the view.  According to the taxonomy here, deflationists such as Horwich who commit to the existence of a single property truth should be classified as monists.  Thus to fully flesh things out, we’d need to distinguish between deflationary monists and substantivist monists (and between deflationary and substantivist pluralists).  Doing so requires a good bit of effort; for details, see Wyatt (2016).
^7	  As I’m using the expressions ‘pluralism about truth’ and ‘truth pluralism,’ one may endorse what is often called ‘alethic pluralism’ without thereby endorsing truth pluralism.  I take truth pluralism to be the view that more than one actual property realizes FT. In other words, truth pluralism is the view that more than one actual property fits the job description for truth—full stop, and hence not merely relative to some domain or other (on this distinction, see David (2013) and Edwards (2011, pp. 34-7)).  Extant alethic pluralists—strong and moderate alike—thus stop short of endorsing truth pluralism.  Strong alethic pluralists (e.g. Cotnoir (2013) and Kim and Pedersen, this volume) take no actual property to realize FT simpliciter and moderate alethic pluralists (e.g. Edwards (2011) and Lynch (2009)) take exactly one such property to do so. This, I would stress, isn’t a criticism of these views, only an observation about their structure.It’s also worth noting that truth pluralism, in the present sense, is structurally similar to Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism, insofar as the properties that would realize FT would do so with respect to all domains.
^8	  In his most recent work (2009, 2013), Lynch has elected to not rely explicitly on Ramsification, thereby departing from the strategy in his earlier, pathbreaking work on functionalism (2000, 2001, 2004b, 2005). However, I would point out that in his recent work, Lynch still speaks of properties playing the ‘truth role.’  The truth role is supplied by PT and playing it looks to be nothing over and above witnessing RT, so it seems that Lynch is still loyal at heart to Ramsification, even though he chooses not to wear the badge.
^9	  Lynch (2009, p. 84; 2013, p. 27) and Wright (2005, n. 14) also allude to this point (see also Devlin (2003)).  However, other authors are a bit too quick in assimilating functionalism to pluralism. I have in mind here the otherwise illuminating critical discussions by Caputo (2012); Horton and Poston (2012); Newhard (2013, 2014, 2017) and Wright (2005, §§ 4.1, 4.2). What I would point out is that the criticisms advanced by these authors affect the functionalist only if they commit to some sort of alethic pluralism—a move that Lynch does make, but which is nevertheless entirely optional.
^10	  Lynch (2004a, ch. 1; 2009, p. 8).
^11	  Lynch (2009, pp. 10-14; 2013, p. 24).
^12	  Cp. Barnard and Ulatowski (2013, 2017); Fisher, et. al (2017); and Mizumoto (ms).  See especially Ulatowski (2017, pp. viii, ix, 2, 8-9).
^13	  I say ‘provisionally’ because it is at this point that we should look for underlying similarities among the concepts that speakers deploy when they use alethic vocabulary.  If we detect such similarities, we should then—and only then—advance a general account of what makes a concept a truth concept.  To do otherwise would amount to gratuitous theory building in the absence of sufficient data.
^14	  Moltmann’s investigations (2015, forthcoming) into truth predicates, and related kinds of predicate, in various natural languages also look to bear significantly on intralinguistic pluralism. The same goes for the work of Dzobo (1992, pp. 79-83) and Wiredu (1985, 1987, 2004) on the Ghanaian languages Ewe and Akan.
^15	  2013, p. 621.
^16	  Ibid. p. 631.
^17	  Ibid. p. 633.
^18	  Ibid. Figs. 2 and 3.
^19	  I include the parenthetical qualification to flag a further sort of variance that Barnard and Ulatowski (ibid. Fig. 1) found among their subjects.  They found that their subjects (male and female alike) were more likely overall to agree with (1) when presented with the Bruno case than when presented with a case involving a simple arithmetical calculation.  We might call this kind of variance topic-sensitivity.  What I would point out is that this topic-sensitivity is independent of intralinguistic pluralism, insofar as the former may be present across the community of English speakers.  For further investigation of topic-sensitivity, see Ulatowski (2017).
^20	  That said, Mizumoto (ms) has gathered interesting data pertaining to Japanese and English that do look to support interlinguistic pluralism.  I should also note the fascinating collection of papers surveyed by Maffie (2001).  By contrast, Matthewson and Glougie (forthcoming) investigate interesting cross-linguistic uniformities in the use of alethic vocabulary.
^21	  I take (WC1) to be a conjecture that Wiredu would be willing to make, although he doesn’t explicitly advance it.  He comes extremely close to doing so at 2004, pp. 47-9.  Cp. 1985, pp. 47-8, 49-50; 1987, p. 28.
^22	  Bourget and Chalmers (2014, § 2) note that in principle, anyone was allowed to take their survey, though the target group about which they mainly report are the professional philosophers from the mentioned departments.
^23	  Bedu-Addo argues that the best Akan expression to use is ‘nokware,’ a view with which Kwame looks to be sympathetic.
^24	  My thinking here has been influenced by some suggestive remarks due to Wright (2005, pp. 18-21).
^25	  The grades of pluralism in (b)-(d) are notably different from the mainstream pluralist truth theories that have been developed thus far. The major difference is that the pluralisms in (b)-(d) make no reference to the notion of a ‘domain,’ which figures prominently in mainstream pluralist theories. Rather, these pluralist views integrate Ramsification with conceptual pluralism, an approach that hasn’t been attempted by mainstream alethic pluralists.
^26	  (2010, p. 8). Cp. (2005, pp. 21-2).
^27	  Cp. Lewis (1970, p. 429).
^28	  In this way, my reply to Wright differs from that of Lynch (2013, n. 12), who grants that functionalism is viciously circular, but insists (less than convincingly, to my mind) that every other theory of truth is viciously circular in the same respect.I should also note that my reply on behalf of functionalism differs from the reply that Wright (2010, § 6) finds most convincing.  I lack the space to examine this reply, but my basic concern is that it rests on a mischaracterization of the functionalist’s ambitions.
^29	  Admittedly, it seems to me that the functionalist need not do so.  By way of analogy, think of a non-racist psychologist studying the race-related concepts used by ordinary, racist subjects. It would be consistent for them to analyze these concepts along functionalist lines while refraining from commitment to the truth of their postulates.  It would seem that the alethic functionalist enjoys a similar sort of freedom when analyzing ordinary thought about truth.
^30	  (4) is grounded in (one direction of) what is sometimes called the transparency of the word ‘true,’ as that word applies to sentences.  It should also be helpful to remember the importance of the concept-property distinction in truth theory, as discussed in §1.
^31	  There is admittedly a further issue that must be explored—namely, how the functionalist could know that S1, that S2, and that S3.  Though I can’t pursue this issue at length here, it’s plausible that the functionalist can acquire this knowledge in a rather familiar way.  They can do so by reflecting on cases that pertain e.g. to the objectivity of truth or to the connections between A’s belief being true and its being correct for A to hold that belief.  Put a bit more generally, the functionalist could come to know that PT is true by competently deploying the truth concept for which PT is the postulate in reflecting on cases that pertain to PT’s conjuncts.
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